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In this paper, the systematisation and classification of modern quantum technologies of information 
security against cyber-terrorist attack are carried out. The characteristic of the basic directions of 
quantum cryptography from the viewpoint of the quantum technologies used is given. A qualitative 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of concrete quantum protocols is made. The current status 
of the problem of practical quantum cryptography use in telecommunication networks is considered. In 





Today there is virtually no area where information technology (ІТ) is not used in some way. Computers support 
banking systems, control the work of nuclear reactors, and control aircraft, satellites and spacecraft. The high level of 
automation therefore depends on the security level of IT. The latest achievements in communication systems are now 
applied in aviation. These achievements are public switched telephone network (PSTN), circuit switched public data 
network (CSPDN), packet switched public data network (PSPDN), local area network (LAN), and integrated services 
digital network (ISDN) [73]. These technologies provide data transmission systems of various types: surface-to-surface, 
surface-to-air, air-to-air, and space telecommunication. Cyber-terrorist attacks [78] can cause economic damage to 
aircraft companies and can also reduce flight security or cause casualties. Protection against such attacks is therefore an 
important scientific and technical problem. 
One of the most effective ways of ensuring confidentiality and data integrity during transmission is cryptographic 
systems. The purpose of such systems is to provide key distribution, authentication, legitimate users authorisation, and 
encryption. Key distribution is one of the most important problems of cryptography. This problem can be solved with 
the help of [58]: classical information-theoretic schemes (requires channel with noise; efficiency is very low, 1–5%), 
classical public-key cryptography schemes (Diffie-Hellman scheme, digital envelope scheme; it has computational 
security), classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptographic schemes (requires a pre-installed key on both 
sides and can be used only as scheme for increase in key size but not as key distribution scheme), quantum key 
distribution (provides information-theoretic security; it can also be used as a scheme for increase in key length), Trusted 
Couriers Key Distribution (it has a high price and is dependent on the human factor). 
In recent years, quantum cryptography (QC) has attracted considerable interest. Quantum key distribution (QKD) 
[2–5, 9–12, 16, 22, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 39, 41–43, 45, 48, 51, 55–58, 61, 71, 74, 78] plays a dominant role in QC. The 
overwhelming majority of theoretic and practical research projects in QC are related to the development of QKD 
protocols. The number of different quantum technologies of information security (QTIS) is increasing, but there is no 
information about classification of these technologies in scientific literature (there are only a few works concerning 
classification of QKD protocols, for example [30, 57]). This makes it difficult to estimate the level of the latest 
achievements and does not allow using QTIS with full efficiency. The purpose of this article is the systematisation and 
classification of up-to-date quantum technologies of data (transmitted via telecommunication channels) security, 
analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, and prospects and difficulties of implementation. Quantum technologies of 
information security consist of quantum key distribution, quantum secure direct communication [7, 8, 13, 14, 17, 62, 70, 
74–76], quantum secret sharing [21, 34, 44, 52, 67, 69], quantum stream cipher [1, 19, 35, 36, 47, 68], quantum digital 
signature [33, 63, 66], quantum steganography [18, 20, 40], etc. 
 
2. Quantum key distribution 
 
QKD includes the following protocols: protocols using single (non-entangled) qubits (two-level quantum systems) 
and qudits (d-level quantum systems, d>2) [2–4, 9–12, 16, 29, 30, 32, 39, 43, 45, 51, 55–58, 61, 71, 78]; protocols 
using phase coding [4, 30]; and protocols using entangled states [25, 26, 41, 42]. 
The main task of QKD protocols is encryption key generation and distribution between two users connecting via 
quantum and classical channels [30]. In 1984 Ch. Bennet from IBM and G. Brassard from Montreal University 
introduced the first QKD protocol [2, 22, 57, 58], which has become an alternative solution for the problem of key 
distribution. This protocol is called BB84 [9, 57, 78] and it refers to QKD protocols using single qubits. The states of 
these qubits are the polarisation states of single photons. The BB84 protocol uses four polarisation states of photons (0°, 
45°, 90°, 135°). These states refer to two mutually unbiased bases [48]. Error searching and correcting is performed 
using classical public channel, which need not be confidential but only authenticated. For the detection of intruder 
actions in the BB84 protocol, an error control procedure is used, and for providing unconditionally security a privacy 
amplification procedure is used [3]. The efficiency of the BB84 protocol equals 50%. Efficiency means the ratio of the 
photons number which are used for key generation to the general number of transmitted photons. Six-state protocol 
requires the usage of four states, which are the same as in the BB84 protocol, and two additional directions of 
polarization: right circular and left circular [12]. Such changes decrease the amount of information, which can be 
intercepted. But on the other hand, the efficiency of the protocol decreases to 33%. Next, the 4+2 protocol is 
intermediate between the BB84 and B92 protocol [39]. There are four different states used in this protocol for 
encryption: 0 and 1 in two bases. States in each bases are selected non-orthogonal. Moreover, states in different bases 
must also be pairwise non-orthogonal. This protocol has a higher IS level than the BB84 protocol, when weak coherent 
pulses but not a single photon source are used by sender [39]. But the efficiency of the 4+2 protocol is lower than 
efficiency of BB84 protocol. In the Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol [32], encryption of 0 and 1 is performed using two 
orthogonal states. Each of these two states is the superposition of two localised normalised wave packets. For protection 
against intercept-resend attack, packets are sent at random times. A modified type of Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol is 
called the Koashi-Imoto protocol [43]. This protocol does not use a random time for sending packets, but it uses an 
interferometer’s non-symmetrisation (the light is broken in equal proportions between both long and short 
interferometer arms).  
The measure of QKD protocol security is Shannon’s mutual information between legitimate users (Alice and Bob) 
and an eavesdropper (Eve): ( )DI AE  and ( )DI BE , where D is error level which is created by eavesdropping. For most 
attacks on QKD protocols, ( ) ( )DIDI BEAE = , we will therefore use ( )DI AE . The lower ( )DI AE  in the extended range 
of D is, the more secure the protocol is. 
Six-state protocol and BB84 protocol were generalised in case of using d-level quantum systems—qudits instead 
qubits [16]. This allows increasing the information capacity of protocols. We can transfer information using d-level 
quantum systems (which correspond to the usage of trits, quarts, etc.) unlike the classical transmission systems, which 
use bits. It is important to notice that QKD protocols are intended for classical information (key) transfer via quantum 
channel.  
The generalisation of BB84 protocol for qudits is called protocol using single qudits and two bases due to use of 
two mutually unbiased bases for the eavesdropping detection. Similarly, the generalisation of six-state protocol is called 
protocol using qudits and d+1 bases. These protocols’ security against intercept-resend attack and non-coherent attack 
was investigated in a number of articles (see e.g. [16]). In [61] comparative analysis of the efficiency and security of 
different protocols using qudits (on the basis of known formulas for mutual information) are carried out. 
In fig. 1 dependences of ( )DI AB , ( )( )DI dAE 1+  and ( )( )DI AE2  are presented, where ( )DI AB  is mutual information 
between Alice and Bob and ( )( )DI dAE 1+  and ( )( )DI AE2  is mutual information between Alice and Eve for protocols using 
d+1 and two bases accordingly. 
 
           a)               b) 
Fig. 1. Mutual information for non-coherent attack. 1, 2, 3— ( )DI AB  for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and d = 16, 32, 64 (b); 4, 5, 6—
( )( )DI dAE 1+  for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and d = 16, 32, 64 (b); 7, 8, 9— ( ) ( )DI AE2  (6) for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and d = 16, 32, 64 (b).  
 
In fig. 1 we can see that at low qudit dimension (up to d ~ 16) the protocol’s security against non-coherent attack is 
higher when d+1 bases are used (when d = 2 it corresponds as noted above to greater security of six-state protocol than 
BB84 protocol). But the protocol’s security is higher when two bases are used in the case of large d, while the 
difference in Eve’s information (using d+1 or two bases) is not large in the work region of the protocol, i.e. in the region 
of Alice’s and Bob’s low error level. We can conclude that the number of bases used has little influence on the security 
of the protocol against non-coherent attack (at least for the qudit dimension up to d = 64). The crossing points of curves 
( )DI AB  and ( )DI AE  correspond to boundary values D, up to which one’s legitimate users can establish a secret key by 
means of a privacy amplification procedure (even when eavesdropping occurs) [3]. 
Article [61] shows that the security of a protocol with qudits using two bases against intercept-resend attack is 
practically equal to the security of this protocol against non-coherent attack at any d. At the same time, the security of 
the protocol using d+1 bases against this attack is much higher. Intercept-resend attack is the weakest of all possible 
attacks on QKD protocols, but on the other hand, the efficiency of the protocol using d+1 bases rapidly decreases as d 
increases. A protocol with qudits using two bases therefore has higher security and efficiency than a protocol using d+1 
bases. 
Another type of QKD protocol is a protocol using phase coding [30]: for example, the B92 protocol [4] using 
strong reference pulses [30]. An eavesdropper can obtain more information about the encryption key in the B92 
protocol than in the BB84 protocol for the given error level, however. Thus, the security of the B92 protocol is lower 
than the security of the BB84 protocol [29]. The efficiency of the B92 protocol is 25%.  
The Ekert protocol (E91) [26, 30, 41] refers to QKD protocols using entangled states. Entangled pairs of qubits 
that are in a singlet state ( )011021 −=ψ −  are used in this protocol. Qubit interception between Alice to 
Bob does not give Eve any information because no coded information is there. Information appears only after legitimate 
users make measurements and communicate via classical public authenticated channel [26]. But attacks with additional 
quantum systems (ancillas) are nevertheless possible on this protocol [41]. 
In article [42] generalisation of the Ekert scheme for three-level quantum systems introduced and in [25] 
generalisation of the Ekert scheme for d-level quantum systems is proposed: this increases the information capacity of 
the protocol a lot. Also in [25] the security of the protocol using entangled qudits is investigated. In article [61], based 
on the results of [25], the security comparison of protocol using entangled qudits and protocols using single qudits [16] 
against non-coherent attack is made. It was found that the security of these two kinds of protocols is almost identical. 
But the efficiency of the protocol using entangled qudits increases more slowly with the increasing dimension of qudits 
than the efficiency of the protocol using single qudits and two bases. Thus, from all contemporary QKD protocols using 
qudits, the most effective and secure against non-coherent attack is the protocol using single qudits and two bases 
(BB84 for qubits).  
The aforementioned protocols with qubits are vulnerable to photon number splitting attack. This attack cannot be 
applied when the photon source emits exactly one photon. But there are still no such photon sources. Therefore, sources 
with Poisson distribution of photon number are used in practice. The part of pulses of this source has more than one 
photon. That is why Eve can intercept one photon from pulse (which contains two or more photons) and store it in 
quantum memory until Alice transfers Bob the sequence of bases used. Then Eve can measure stored states in correct 
basis and get the cryptographic key while remaining invisible. It should be noted that there are more advanced strategies 
of photon number splitting attack which allow Bob to get the correct statistics of the photon number in pulses if Bob is 
controlling these statistics [45]. In practice for realisation of BB84 and six-state protocols weak coherent pulses with 
average photon number about 0.1 are used. This allows avoiding small probability of two- and multi-photon pulses, but 
this also considerably reduces the key rate.  
The SARG04 protocol does not differ much from the original BB84 protocol [10, 56, 57]. The main difference 
does not refer to the ‘quantum’ part of the protocol; it refers to the ‘classical’ procedure of key sifting, which goes after 
quantum transfer. Such improvement allows increasing security against photon number splitting attack. The SARG04 
protocol in practice has a higher key rate than the BB84 protocol [10].  
Another way of protecting against photon number splitting attack is the use of decoy states QKD protocols [11, 51, 
55, 57, 71], which are also advanced types of BB84 protocol. In such protocols, besides information signals Alice’s 
source also emits additional pulses (decoys) in which the average photon number differs from the average photon 
number in the information signal. Eve’s attack will modify the statistical characteristics of the decoy states and/or signal 
state and will be detected. As practical experiments have shown for these protocols (as for the SARG04 protocol), the 
key rate and practical length of the channel is bigger than for BB84 protocols [51, 55, 71]. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to notice that using these protocols, as well as the others considered above, it is also impossible without users pre-
authentication to construct the complete high-grade solution of the problem of key distribution. 
As a conclusion, after the analysis of the first and scale QTIS method, we must sum up and highlight the following 
advantages of QKD protocols: 1) These protocols always allow eavesdropping to be detected because Eve’s connection 
brings much more error level (compared with natural error level) to the quantum channel. The laws of quantum 
mechanics allow eavesdropping to be detected and the dependence between error level and intercepted information to 
be set. This allows applying privacy amplification procedure, which decreases the quantity of information about the 
key, which can be intercepted by Eve. Thus, QKD protocols have unconditional (information-theoretic) security; 2) the 
information-theoretic security of QKD allows using an absolutely secret key for further encryption using well-known 
classical symmetrical algorithms. Thus, the entire information security level increases. It is also possible to synthesize 
QKD protocols with Vernam cipher (one-time pad) which in complex with unconditionally secured authenticated 
schemes gives a totally secured system for transferring information.  
The disadvantages of quantum key distribution protocols are: 1) A system based only on QKD protocols cannot 
serve as a complete solution for key distribution in open networks (additional tools for authentication are needed); 2) 
the limitation of quantum channel length which is caused by the fact that there is no possibility of amplification without 
quantum properties being lost; 3) need for using weak coherent pulses instead of single photon pulses. This decreases 
the efficiency of protocol in practice. But this technology limitation might be defeated in the nearest future; 4) the data 
transfer rate decreases rapidly with the increase in the channel length. When the channel length is 100 km, the data 
transfer rate equals few bps; 5) photon registration problem which leads to key rate decreasing in practice; 6) photon 
depolarization in the quantum channel. This leads to errors during data transfer. Now the typical error level equals a few 
percent, which is much greater than the error level in classical communication systems; 7) difficulty of the practical 
realisation of QKD protocols for d-level quantum systems; 8) the high price of commercial QKD systems.  
 
3. Quantum secure direct communication 
 
The next method of information security based on quantum technologies is the usage of quantum secure direct 
communication (QSDC) protocols [7, 8, 13, 14, 17, 62, 70, 74–76]. The main feature of QSDC protocols is that there 
are no cryptographic transformations; thus, there is no key distribution problem in QSDC. In these protocols, a secret 
message is coded by qubits’ (qudits’) quantum states, which are sent via quantum channel. QSDC protocols can be 
divided into several types: ping-pong protocol (and its enhanced variants) [7, 14, 75, 76], protocols using block transfer 
of entangled qubits [17, 62], protocols using single qubits [13] and protocols using entangled qudits [62]. There are 
QSDC protocols for two parties and for multi-parties, e.g. broadcasting or when one user sends message to another 
under the control of a trusted third party. 
Most contemporary protocols require a transfer of qubits by blocks [17, 62]. This allows eavesdropping to be 
detected in the quantum channel before transfer of information. Thus, transfer will be terminated and Eve will not 
obtain any secret information. But for storing such blocks of qubits there is a need for a large amount of quantum 
memory. The technology of quantum memory is actively being researched, but it is still far from usage in common 
standard telecommunication equipment. So from the viewpoint of technical realisation, protocols using single qubits or 
their non-large groups (for one cycle of protocol) have an advantage. There are few such protocols and they have only 
asymptotic security, i.e. the attack will be detected with high probability, but Eve can obtain some part of information 
before detection. Thus, the problem of privacy amplification appears. In other words, new pre-processing methods of 
transferring information are needed. Such methods should make intercepted information negligible. 
One of the quantum secure direct communication protocols is the ping-pong protocol [7, 14, 62, 75, 76], which 
does not require qubit transfer by blocks. In the first variant of this protocol, entangled pairs of qubits and two coding 
operations that allow the transmission of one bit of classical information for one cycle of the protocol are used [7]. The 
usage of quantum superdense coding allows transmitting two bits for a cycle [14]. The subsequent increase in the 
informational capacity of the protocol is possible by the usage instead of entangled pairs of qubits their triplets, 
quadruplets etc. in Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [76]. The informational capacity of the ping-pong 
protocol with GHZ-states is equal to n bits on a cycle where n is the number of entangled qubits. Another way of 
increasing the informational capacity of ping-pong protocol is using entangled states of qudits. Thus, the corresponding 
protocol based on Bell’s states of three-level quantum system (qutrit) pairs and superdense coding for qutrits is 
introduced in [62, 75]. 
The advantages of QSDC protocols are a lack of secret key distribution, the possibility of data transfer between 
more than two parties, and the possibility of attack detection providing a high level of IS (up to information-theoretic 
security) for the protocols using block transfer. The main disadvantages are difficulty in practical realisation of 
protocols using entangled states (and especially protocols using entangled states for d-level quantum systems), slow 
transfer rate, the need for large capacity quantum memory for all parties (for protocols using block transfer of qubits), 
and the asymptotic security of the ping-pong protocol. Besides, QSDC protocols similarly to QKD protocols is 
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack, although such attack can be neutralized by using authentication of all messages, 
which are sent via the classical channel. 
Asymptotic security of the ping-pong protocol (which is one of the simplest QSDC protocols from the technical 
viewpoint) can be amplified by using methods of classical cryptography. Security of several types of ping-pong 
protocols using qubits and qutrits against different attacks was investigated in series of works [7, 14, 70, 75, 76]. The 
security of the ping-pong protocol using qubits against eavesdropping attack using ancilla states is investigated [17, 76]. 
In fig. 2 dependences of composite probability of not detecting an attack for the ping-pong protocol with many-qubit 
GHZ-states are shown. It is obvious from fig. 2 that the ping-pong protocol with many-qubit GHZ-states is 
asymptotically secure at any number n of qubits that are in entangled GHZ-states. A similar result for the ping-pong 
protocol using Bell states of qutrit pairs is presented [75]. 
 
 Fig. 2. Composite probability of attack non-detection s for the ping-pong protocol with many-qubit GHZ-states: n=2, original 
protocol (1); n=2, with superdense coding (2); n=3 (3); n=5 (4); n=10 (5); n=16 (6). I is Eve’s information. 
A non-quantum method of security amplification for the ping-pong protocol is suggested in [76]. This method is as 
follows. Before the transmission, Alice divides the binary message on l block of some fixed length r; we will designate 
these blocks through ia   (i=1, …, l). Alice then generates for each block separately random invertible binary matrix iK  
of size rr ×  and multiplies these matrices by appropriate blocks of the message iii aKb =  (multiplication is performed 
by modulo 2). Blocks ib  are transmitted on the quantum channel with the use of the ping-pong protocol. Even if Eve 
manages to intercept one (or more) from these blocks while remaining undetected, not knowing matrices iK  used, Eve 
cannot reconstruct source blocks ia . To reach sufficient security level, the block length r and accordingly the size of 
matrices iK  should be selected so that Eve’s probability of non-detection s after the transmission of one block is 
insignificant small. Matrices iK  are transmitted to Bob via usual (non-quantum) open authentic channel after the end of 
quantum transmission but only in the event that Alice and Bob are convinced of lack of eavesdropping. Bob then 
inverses the received matrices and having multiplied them on appropriate blocks ib  he gains the original message. 
This method allows providing high security level of the ping-pong protocol (choosing suitable length of blocks for 
hashing). Rounded values of block length r for the ping-pong protocol with n-qubit GHZ-states at 610−=s  and for the 
case when Eve aspires to get all information and makes maximal error level for legitimate users are presented in table 1. 
The probability of detecting the attack is maximal in this case [76]. The quantity of q is a probability of switching to 
control mode [7, 76]. 
 
Table 1. Rounded values of block length r for the ping-pong protocol with n-qubit GHZ-states (bit) 
 
n q = 0.5, maxdd =  q = 0.25, maxdd =  
2 69 180 
3 74 186 
4 88 216 
5 105 254 
6 123 297 
7 142 341 
8 161 387 
9 180 434 
10 200 481 
11 220 529 
12 240 577 
13 260 625 
14 279 673 
15 299 721 
16 319 769 
17 339 817 
18 359 865 
19 379 913 
20 399 961 
 
Thus, after transfer of hashed block, the lengths of which are presented in tab. 1, the probability of attack non-
detection will be equal to 10-6; there is thus a very high probability that this attack will be detected. The main 
disadvantage of the ping-pong protocol, namely its asymptotic security against eavesdropping attack using ancilla 
states, is therefore removed. There are some others attacks on the ping-pong protocol, e.g. attack which can be 
performed when the protocol is executed in quantum channel with noise [70]. But there are some counteraction methods 
to these attacks [8]. Thus, we can say that the ping-pong protocol (the security of which is amplified using method 
described above) is the most prospective QSDC protocol from the viewpoint of the existing development level of the 
quantum technology of information processing. 
 
4. Other quantum methods of information security 
 
Quantum secret sharing (QSS). Most QSS protocols use properties of entangled states [9, 48]. The first QSS 
protocol was proposed by Hillery, Buzek and Berthiaume in 1998 [34, 52]. This protocol uses GHZ-triplets 
(quadruplets) similar to some QSDC protocols. The sender shares his message between two (three) parties and only 
cooperation allows them to read this message. Semi-quantum secret sharing protocol using GHZ-triplets (quadruplets) 
is proposed in [44]. In this protocol, users that receive a shared message have access to the quantum channel. But they 
are limited by some set of operation and are called ‘classical’, meaning they are not able to prepare entangled states and 
perform any quantum operations or measurements. These users can measure qubits on a ‘classical’ { }1,0  basis, 
reordering the qubits (via proper delay measurements), preparing (fresh) qubits in the classical basis, and sending or 
returning the qubits without disturbance. The sending party can perform any quantum operations. This protocol prevails 
over others QSS protocols in economic terms. Its equipment is cheaper because expensive devices for preparing and 
measuring (in GHZ-basis) many-qubit entangled states are not required. Semi-quantum secret sharing protocol exists in 
two variants: randomisation-based and measurement-resend protocols. In article [69] QSS using single qubits that are 
prepared in two mutually unbiased bases and transferred by blocks is presented. Similar to the Hillery-Buzek-
Berthiaume protocol, this allows sharing a message between two (or more) parties. The security improvement of this 
protocol against malicious acts of legitimate users is proposed in [21]. A similar protocol for multiparty secret sharing is 
presented in article [67]. QSS protocols are protected against external attackers and unfair actions of the protocol’s 
parties. Both quantum and semi-quantum schemes allow detecting eavesdropping and do not require encryption unlike 
the classical secret-sharing schemes. The most significant imperfection of QSS protocols is the necessity for large 
quantum memory that is outside the capabilities of modern technologies today. 
Quantum stream cipher (QSC) provides data encryption similar to classical stream cipher, but it uses quantum 
noise effect [36] and can be used in optical communication networks. QSC is based on the Yuen-2000 protocol (Y-00, 
αη - scheme). Information-theoretic security of the Y-00 protocol is ensured by randomisation (based on quantum 
noise) and additional computational schemes [68]. In articles [19, 35] the high encryption rate of the Y-00 protocol is 
demonstrated experimentally, and in [35] a security analysis on the Yuen-2000 protocol against the fast correlation 
attack, the typical attack on stream ciphers, is presented. The next advantage is better security compared with usual 
(classical) stream cipher. This is achieved by quantum noise effect and by the impossibility of cloning quantum states 
[65]. The complexity of practical implementation is the most important imperfection of QSC [35]. 
Quantum digital signature (QDS) can be implemented on the basis of protocols such as QDS protocols using 
single qubits [63] and QDS protocols using entangled states (authentic QDS based on quantum GHZ-correlations) [66]. 
QDS is based on use of the quantum one-way function [33]. This function has better security than the classical one-way 
function, and it has information-theoretic security (its security does not depend on the power of the attacker’s 
equipment). Quantum one-way function is defined by the following properties of quantum systems [33]: 1) qubits can 
exist in superposition 0 and 1 unlike classical bits; 2) we can get only a limited quantity of classical information from 
quantum states (according to the Holevo theorem) [37, 48]. Calculation and validation are not difficult but inverse 
calculation is impossible. In the systems that use QDS, user identification and integrity of information is provided 
similar to classical digital signature [33]. The main advantages of QDS protocols are information-theoretic security and 
simplified key distribution system. The main disadvantage is the possibility to generate a limited number of public key 
copies and the leak of some quantities of information about incoming data of quantum one-way function (unlike the 
ideal classical one-way function) [33]. 
Quantum steganography [40] aims to hide the fact of information transferral similar to classical steganography. In 
articles [20, 40] models of quantum steganography systems are proposed, but there is no case of the practical 
implementation of these systems. All current models of quantum steganography systems use entangled states. For 
example, modified methods of entangled photon pair detection are used to hide the fact of information transfer in patent 
[18]. Theoretical research in this area has not reached the level of practical application yet, and it is very difficult to talk 
about the advantages and disadvantages of quantum steganography systems. Whether quantum steganography is 
superior to the classical one or not in practical use is still an open question [40].  
Fig. 3 represents a general scheme of quantum methods of IS for their purposes and for using QTIS. 
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Fig. 3. Classification of quantum methods of IS 
 
5. Commercial QKD Systems 
 
The world’s first commercial quantum cryptography solution was QPN Security Gateway (QPN-8505) [54] 
proposed by MagiQ Technologies (USA). This system is a cost-effective IS solution for governmental and financial 
organisations. It proposes VPN protection using QKD (up to 100 256-bit keys per second, up to 140 km) and integrated 
encryption. The QPN-8505 system uses BB84, 3DES [50] and AES [49] protocols. The Swiss company Id Quantique 
offers a system called Cerberis [15]. It is a server with automatic creation and secret key exchange over a fibre channel 
(FC-1G, FC-2G and FC-4G). This system can transmit cryptographic keys up to 50 km and carries out 12 parallel 
cryptographic calculations. The latter substantially improves the system’s performance. The Cerberis system uses AES 
(256-bits) for encryption and BB84 and SARG04 protocols for quantum key distribution. Toshiba Research Europe Ltd 
(Great Britain) recently presented another QKD system named Quantum Key Server [53]. This system has a very 
simple architecture and provides up to 100 256-bit keys per second with their one-way transferring from sender to 
receiver. Quantum Key Server includes an integrated automatic control module that provides continuous monitoring 
and regulation of the system’s optical characteristics. Another British company, QinetiQ, realised the world’s first 
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network using quantum cryptography—Quantum Net (Qnet) [27, 38]. The maximum length of communication lines in 
this network is 120 km. Moreover, it is a very important fact that Qnet is the first QKD system using more than two 
servers. This system has six servers integrated to the Internet. 
In addition the world’s leading scientists are actively taking part in the implementation of projects such as 
SECOQC (Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) [58] and EQCSPOT (European Quantum 
Cryptography and Single Photon Technologies). There are many practical and theoretical research projects concerning 
the development of QTIS in research institutes, laboratories and centres (Northwestern University, BBN Technologies 
of Cambridge, TREL, NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, ARS Seibersdorf Research, Los Alamos National Laboratory) [72]. 
Most methods and facilities of quantum cryptography are patented [6, 23, 24, 28, 31, 46, 59, 60, 64, 77, 79, 80] in 




This article presents a classification and systematisation of modern quantum technology of information security. 
The characteristic of the basic directions of quantum cryptography from the point of view of the quantum technologies 
used is given. A qualitative analysis of the advantages and imperfections of concrete quantum protocols is made. Today 
the most developed direction of quantum cryptography is QKD protocols. In research institutes, laboratories and 
centres, quantum cryptographic systems for secret key distribution for distant legitimate users are being developed. 
Most of the technologies used in these systems are patented in different countries (mainly in the U.S.A.). Such QKD 
systems can be combined with any classical cryptographic scheme, which provides information-theoretic security, and 
the entire cryptographic scheme will have information-theoretic security also. QKD protocols can generally provide 
higher IS level than appropriate classical schemes. 
Other quantum technologies of information security (QTIS) in practice have not yet extended beyond laboratory 
experiments. But there are many theoretical cryptographic schemes that provide high IS level up to the information-
theoretic security. Quantum secure direct communication protocols do not have any analogues in classical 
cryptography. These protocols remove the secret key distribution problem because they do not use encryption. One of 
these is the ping-pong protocol and its improved versions. These protocols can provide high IS level of confidential data 
transmission using the existing level of technology with security amplification methods. Another category of QSDC is 
protocols with transfer qubit by blocks that have unconditional security, but these need a large quantum memory which 
is outside the capabilities of modern technologies today. It should be noted that QSDC protocols are not suitable for the 
transfer of a high-speed flow of confidential data because there is low data transfer rate in the quantum channel. But 
when a high IS level is more important than transfer rate, QSDC protocols should find its application. 
Quantum secret sharing protocols allow detecting eavesdropping and do not require data encryption. This is their 
main advantage over classical secret sharing schemes. Similarly, quantum stream cipher and quantum digital signature 
provide higher security level than classical schemes. Quantum digital signature has information-theoretic security 
because it uses quantum one-way function. However, practical implementation of these QTIS is also faced with some 
technological difficulties. 
Thus, in recent years QTIS are rapidly developing and gradually taking their place among other means of IS. Their 
advantage is a high level of security and some properties, which classical means of IS do not have. One of these 
properties is the ability always to detect eavesdropping. QTIS therefore represent an important step towards improving 
the security of communication systems against cyber-terrorist attacks. But many theoretical and practical problems must 
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